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Abstract—This paper analyzes the ergodic secrecy capacity
of an energy-constrained multiple-antennas amplify-and-forward
(AF) relaying system in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
In the first phase, the source broadcasts information signal,
while the destination sends an artificial jamming signal. The
jamming signal has two main purposes: 1) enhancing the system
security; 2) increasing the energy harvesting (EH) at the relay
node. In the second phase, the relay uses the harvested energy
to amplify and forward the received signal to the destination.
For this system model, explicit mathematical expressions for the
ergodic secrecy capacity are derived for three different common
EH-relaying protocols, namely, power splitting relaying (PSR),
antenna selection and power splitting (ASPS) receiver, and ideal
relaying receiver (IRR). Monte-Carlo simulations are included
to validate the analysis and the effect of different parameters on
the system security are investigated. The results show that, the
ASPS receiver outperforms PSR in terms of secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
IRELESS power transfer has attracted considerable
attention in recent years. This idea is based on the
fact that radio frequency (RF) signals are able to carry
information and energy at the same time. This technique is
called simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) [1], [2]. This technique is attractive for battery-
limited devices which are hard to access, to recharge or to
be replaced, for instance, sensor nodes operating in dangerous
places. The concept of SWIPT technique was first introduced
in [1], where a tradeoff between the rates at which reliable
information and energy signals over a noisy channel was
studied. Later, the effect of additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) and frequency selective fading on SWIPT perfor-
mance was investigated in [2]. These works, however, assumed
that processing information and harvesting energy are achieved
simultaneously from the same received signals by using an
ideal receiver; this assumption might be unrealistic due to
the practical limitations. On contrary, more practical receivers,
namely, time switching (TS) and power splitting (PS) receivers
were proposed in [3]. Moreover, the efficiency of wireless
power transfer in SWIPT depends on the wireless channel
characteristics, and therefore, using multiple-antennas and co-
operative techniques can enhance the system performance [3].
For instance, the performance of an amplify-and-forward (AF)
relay network, with an EH-relay node solely relying on RF
EH was studied in [4] and [5], wherein different efficient EH-
relaying protocols, i.e., power splitting relaying (PSR), time
switching relaying (TSR), and antenna selection and power
splitting (ASPS) receiver were proposed. On the other hand,
recently there has been considerable interest in enhancing
the physical layer security (PLS) in SWIPT networks. For
instance, cooperative jamming technique was considered in
[6] to enhance the security and EH of SWIPT systems. In
addition, in our previous work in [7], a comparison between
the TSR, and PSR was provided and we found that the PSR
outperforms TSR in terms of the secrecy capacity.
In this paper, the secrecy of an EH multiple-antennas
AF relaying system is investigated in terms of the secrecy
capacity. Three common EH relaying protocols are considered,
namely, PSR, ASPS and ideal relaying receiver (IRR). A
cooperative jamming technique is used to enhance the system
security and to increase the harvesting energy. To elaborate,
the communication between the transmitter and the receiver is
achieved in two phases. In phase I, while the transmitter sends
the information signal, the receiver transmits an artificial noise
(AN) signal; therefore, the relay can harvest energy from two
different signals. In phase II, the relay amplifies and forwards
the received signal to the destination by using the harvested
energy from Phase I. Since the receiver has full knowledge
of the AN signal and the system parameters, the AN com-
ponent can be accurately eliminated from its received signal.
The contribution of this work is as follows, firstly explicit
mathematical expressions for the ergodic secrecy capacity of
the PSR-, ASPS- and IRR-based systems of the proposed
relaying model are derived. The analysis are confirmed by
Monte-Carlo simulations. Further, we investigate the impact
of different system parameters on the system security.
The notations used in this paper are: bold lowercase letters
denote vectors. Transpose operation, and conjugate transpose
are denoted by (.)
†
, and (.)
H
, respectively. The notation |.|
represents the absolute value and ‖.‖ denotes Euclidean norm.
log2 (.) represents logarithm of base-2. Circularly symmetric,
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
is denoted by CN (µ,σ2); E (.) is expectation operation and
∈ Cn×m represent n×m matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless system model consisting of a single
antenna source node, a single antenna legitimate receiver node
and a multiple-antennas, Nr, AF relay node in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper equipped with a single antenna, as
shown in Fig. 1. In this system, the relay is EH-node and
depends only on the harvested energy to amplify and forward
the received signals to the destination, while the source and
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Figure 1: System model for energy-constrained multiple-antennas relay.
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Figure 2: Frame structure of PSR protocol.
destination nodes both have fixed power supplies. The chan-
nel coefficients between the nodes are presented in Fig. 1,
where hsr ∈ CNr×1 denotes the channel vector between the
source and relay node, hrd ∈ C1×Nr is the channel vector
between the relay and destination, and gre ∈ C1×Nr denotes
the channel vector between the relay and the eavesdropper.
All channels are assumed to be quasi-static block fading,
following a Rayleigh distribution magnitude with the forward-
backward channels being symmetric. The distances between
the nodes, i.e., source-to-relay, relay-to-destination, and relay-
to-eavesdropper are denoted by dsr, drd and dre, respectively.
We assume that the channel state information (CSI) of the
legitimate system nodes are unknown at the eavesdropper
[8] and the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown at the other
nodes. Due to the deep shadowing, it is also assumed that
all communications in the system are achieved through the
relay and there are no direct links between the source and
destination, and between the source and eavesdropper. This
assumption has been extensively studied in literature for the
cooperative systems [9].
In order to measure the system security, we consider the
secrecy capacity, Cs, which is the maximum difference be-
tween the mutual information of the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper. Therefore, the ergodic secrecy capacity for the
proposed system model is given by [10, page 4692]
C¯s = [E (Cd)− E (Ce)]+ , (1)
where [x]+= max (0, x), Cd is the destination capacity, and
Ce is the eavesdropper capacity. The ergodic secrecy capacity
for the PSR, ASPS and IRR protocols are derived in the
following sections.
III. POWER SPLITTING RELAYING (PSR)
Fig. 2 illustrates frame structure for the PSR protocol, where
T is the total block time. Half of this time, T/2, is used for
information transmission from the transmitter to the relay and
the other half is used for information transmission from the
relay to the receiver. In the first half, a part of the received
signal power, ρP , is used for EH and the other part, (1− ρ)P ,
is allocated for the information transmission, with 0 ≤ ρ ≤
1. During the second time slot, the relay consumes all the
harvested energy to amplify and forward the received signal
to the destination. Consequently, the received signal at the
input of EH receiver of the relay is
yrEH =
√
ρPs
dmsr
hsrs+
√
ρPd
dmrd
h
†
rdυd +
√
ρna, (2)
where s is the transmitted signal from the source with,
E
[
|s|2
]
= 1, Ps is the source power, υd is the AN signal
transmitted by the legitimate receiver, E
[
|υd|2
]
= 1, Pd
is the destination power, m is the path loss exponent and
na ∼ CN
(
0, σ2aINr
)
is the AWGN vector introduced by
the receiver antennas at the relay [5]. From (2), the energy
harvested, Eh, at the relay node is given by [7]
Eh =
η ρ T
2
[
Ps
dmsr
‖hsr‖2 + Pd
dmrd
‖hrd‖2 +Nrσ2a
]
. (3)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 is the EH efficiency. The signal at the relay’s
information receiver can be expressed by
yr =
√
(1− ρ)Ps
dmsr
hsrs+
√
(1− ρ)Pd
dmrd
h
†
rdυd + nr, (4)
where nr ∼ CN
(
0, σ2rINr
)
is an Nr × 1 AWGN vector
at the relay, and is given by nr =
√
1− ρna + nc, while
nc ∼ CN
(
0, σ2cINr
)
denotes the noise vector introduced
by the information receiver [4], [5]. The transmitted signal
by the relay in the second phase is, xr = Gyr, where
G =
√
Prβp denotes the relay gain, Pr is the relay power and
βp =
(
(1−ρ)Ps
dmsr
‖hsr‖2 + (1−ρ)Pddmrd ‖hrd‖
2
+Nrσ
2
r
)−1
. Since
the legitimate receiver has full knowledge of the AN signal and
the system parameters, i.e., the distance between the nodes, the
channel coefficients, and the relay gain, the AN term can be
easily eliminated at the destination; as a result, the received
signal at the destination, yd, can be written as [8]
yd =
√
(1− ρ)PsPrβp
dmsrd
m
rd
hrdhsr s+
√
Prβphrd√
dmrd
nr +nd. (5)
where nd is AWGN at the destination with variance σ
2
d. On
the other side, the received signal at the eavesdropper is given
by [8]
ye =
√
(1− ρ)PsPrβp
dmsrd
m
re
gre hsr s+
√
(1− ρ)PdPrβp√
dmrdd
m
re
greh
†
rd υd
+
√
Prβpgre√
dmre
nr + ne. (6)
The relay power is calculated as Pr =
Eh
T/2 .
By using (3), Pr can be written as Pr =
η ρ
[
Ps
dmsr
‖hsr‖2 + Pddmrd ‖hrd‖
2
+Nrσ
2
a
]
. By substituting
Pr into (5) and (6), it is easy to find the signal-to-interference
noise ratios (SINRs) at the destination and the eavesdropper
nodes, respectively, as,
γd =
a |hrdhsr|2
b ‖hrd‖2 + c ‖hrd‖2 + r
, (7)
γe =
a1 |grehsr|2
b1
∣∣∣greh†rd∣∣∣2 + c1 ‖gre‖2 + r1 ‖gre‖2 + ω
, (8)
where a = η ρ (1− ρ)Ps, b = η ρ dmsrσ2c ,
c = η ρ (1− ρ) dmsrσ2a, r = (1− ρ) dmsrdmrdσ2d,
a1 = η ρ (1− ρ)Psdmrd, b1 = η ρ (1− ρ) dmsrPd,
c1 = η ρ (1− ρ) dmsrdmrdσ2a, r1 = η ρ dmsrdmrdσ2c and
ω = (1− ρ) dmsrdmrddmreσ2e .
Theorem 1. The ergodic secrecy capacity for the PSR protocol
is given by
C¯ [PSR]s =
[
E
[
CPSRd
]− E [CPSRe ]]+ , (9)
where E
[
CPSRd
]
and E
[
CPSRd
]
are given, respectively, by
(10) and (12), shown at the top of the next page, which can
be approximated using Gaussian Quadrature rule as in (11)
and (13) where zi and Hi are the i
th zero and the weighting
factor of the Laguerre polynomials, respectively, [11].
Proof: To start with (7) can be written as γd =
X
b+c+Y ,
where X = a |hrdhsr|
2
‖hrd‖2 and Y =
r
‖hrd‖2 . Consequently, the
ergodic capacity at the destination can be given as
E
[
CPSRd
]
=
1
2
E
[
log2
(
1 +
X
b+ c+ Y
)]
. (14)
From [12], the ergodic capacity for any random variables
x, y > 0, can be calculated by
E
[
ln
(
1 +
x
y
)]
=
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(My (z)−My+x (z)) dz, (15)
where Mx (z) is the moment generating function (MGF) of
the random variable x. Therefore, (14) can be rewritten as
E
[
CPSRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
Mb+c+Y (z) (1−MX (z)) dz.
(16)
Conditioned on hrd, X has exponential distribution with
parameter λx > 0 [7], its MGF is, MX (z) = λxλx+(az) . Since
the random variable ‖hrd‖2 follows chi-square distribution,
the MGF of, b + c + Y can be written as, Mb+c+Y (z) =
2 e−(b+c) (r z)Nr/2 KNr (2
√
r z)
Γ(Nr)
, where Γ (.) denotes the Gamma
function and KNr (.) is the N
th
r order modified Bessel
function of the second kind. By substituting MX (z) and
Mb+c+Y (z) into (16), we can find the destination ergodic
capacity as in (10). Following similar steps, we can find the
ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper as in (12).
IV. ANTENNA SELECTION AND POWER SPLITTING
RECEIVER (ASPS)
In ASPS receiver, the Nr antennas are divided into two
groups and the received signal at the relay yr is divided
into two sub-signals: yrAand yrB . The first antennas group
(1 to n) is used to harvest energy and forward signals by PS
technique, where a fraction of the received sub-signal power
λP , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, is allocated for EH and the remaining power,
(1− λ)P , is allocated for the information transmission. The
second antennas group (n+1 to Nr) are used only for EH. Our
investigation in this paper is based on1, n = Nr2 . Therefore,
in the first phase, the received signal at the relay is expressed
by
yr =
√
Ps
dmsr
hsrs+
√
Pd
dmrd
h
†
rdυd + na, (17)
where yr =
[
yr1, yr2 , ....., yrNr
]†
. The harvested power from
yr is hence given by
Pr = η
[
Ps
dmsr
(
λ
n∑
i=1
|hsri|2+
Nr∑
i=n+1
|hsri|2
)
+
Pd
dmrd
(
λ
n∑
i=1
|hrdi|2+
Nr∑
i=n+1
|hrdi|2
)]
, (18)
where hsri is the channel between the source and an-
tenna i and hrdi is the channel between the destina-
tion and Antenna i. During the second phase, the relay
forwards the signal, xr = G
(√
1− λyrA + nc
)
, where
yrA = [yr1, yr2 , ....., yrn ]
†
and G =
√
Prβp and βp =
 (1−λ)Ps n∑i=1|hsri|2
dmsr
+
(1−λ)Pd
n∑
i=1
|hrdi|2
dmrd
+Nrσ
2
c


−1
. The re-
ceived signal at the destination after removing the AN can
be written as
yd =
√
(1− λ)PsPrβp
dmsrd
m
rd
hrd,1hsr,1 s+
√
Prβp√
dmrd
hrd,1nr + nd,
(19)
where hsr,1 is the channel vector between the source and the
first antennas group, hrd,1 is the channel vector between the
destination and the first antennas group and nr = (1− λ)na+
nc. The received signal at the eavesdropper is hence given by
ye =
√
(1− λ)PsPrβp
dmsrd
m
re
gre1hsr,1s
+
√
(1− λ)PdPrβp
dmrdd
m
re
gre1hrd,1υd+
√
Prβp√
dmre
gre1nr+ne, (20)
where gre1 is the channel vector between the eavesdropper
and the first antennas group. Substituting (18) into (19) and
(20), we can obtain the SINRs at the destination and the
1For more details about ASPS receiver, please refer to [5].
E
[
CPSRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λx
λx + az
)
2 e−z(b+c) (r z)Nr/2KNr (2
√
r z)
Γ (Nr)
dz. (10)
E
[
CPSRd
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λx (b+ c)
(b+ c)λx + azi
) 2 ( r zi(b+c))Nr/2KNr
(
2
√
r zi
(b+c)
)
Γ (Nr)
(11)
E
[
CPSRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λΦ
λΦ + a1z
)
e−z(c1+r1)
(
λΥ
λΥ + b1z
)
2 (ω z)
Nr/2 KNr (2
√
ω z)
Γ (Nr)
dz. (12)
E
[
CPSRe
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λΦ (c1 + r1)
(c1 + r1)λΦ + a1zi
) (
λΥ (c1 + r1)
λΥ (c1 + r1) + b1zi
) 2 ( ω zi(c1+r1)
)Nr/2
KNr
(
2
√
ω zi
(c1+r1)
)
Γ (Nr)
(13)
eavesdropper nodes, respectively, as γd =
a1|hrd,1hsr,1|2
a2‖hrd,1‖2+a3 , and
γe =
b1|gre1hsr,1|2
b2|gre1hrd,1|2+b3‖gre1‖2+b4 , where a1 = (1− λ)PsPrβp,
a2 = Prβp d
m
srσ
2
r , a3 = d
m
srd
m
rdσ
2
d, b1 = (1− λ)PsPrβpdmrd,
b2 = (1− λ)PdPrβp dmsr, b3 = Prβp σ2r dmsrdmrd, b4 =
dmsrd
m
rdd
m
reσ
2
e and σ
2
r = (1− λ)σ2a+σ2c . For simplicity in this
scheme we derive the ergodic secrecy capacity in interference
limited (Int-Lim) systems.
Theorem 2. The ergodic secrecy capacity for the ASPS
receiver in interference limited systems can be obtained by
C¯ [ASPS]s =
[
E
[
CASPSd
]− E [CASPSe ]]+ , (21)
where E
[
CASPSd
]
is given by,
E
[
CASPSd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λχ
λχ + a1z
)
e−z a2dz (22)
E
[
CASPSd
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λχa2
λχa2 + a1zi
)
(23)
and E
[
CASPSd
]
is given as in (24) and (25).
Proof: To start with, the SINR at the destina-
tion can be simplified as, γd =
χ
a2+Υ
, where χ =
a1|hrd,1hsr,1|2
‖hrd,1‖2 , Υ =
a3
‖hrd,1‖2 . For simplicity in this
scheme we derived the ergodic capacities in Int-Lim sys-
tems. Using (15), we can write the ergodic capacity as,
E
[
CASPSd
]
= 12 ln(2)
∞´
0
1
z (1−Mχ (z))Ma2 (z) dz, where
Mχ (z) = λχλχ+(a1×z) , Ma2 (z) = e−z a2 . Following similar
steps, we can find the ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper as
in (24).
V. IDEAL RELAYING RECEIVER (IRR)
In IRR, during the first time slot, T/2, the relay harvests the
energy and process information and in the second time slot,
T/2, the relay amplifies and forwards the received signal by
using the harvested energy. The relay power can be written
as, Pr = η
[
Ps
dmsr
‖hsr‖2 + Pddmrd ‖hrd‖
2
+Nrσ
2
a
]
. The received
signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, are
yd =
√
PsPrβi
dmsrd
m
rd
hrdhsr s+
√
Prβi
dmrd
hrdnr + nd, (26)
and
ye =
√
PsPrβi
dmsrd
m
re
grehsrs+
√
PdPrβi
dmrdd
m
re
greh
†
rdυd
+
√
Prβi
dmre
grenr + ne (27)
where βi =
(
Ps
dmsr
‖hsr‖2 + Pddmrd ‖hrd‖
2
+Nrσ
2
r
)−1
. By sub-
stituting Pr into (26) and (27), the SINR expressions at
the destination and eavesdropper, respectively, are γd =
a|hrdhsr|2
b‖hrd‖2+c ,
and γe =
a1|grehsr|2
b1|greh†rd|2+c1‖gre‖2+r1 , where a = η Ps, b =
η dmsrσ
2
r , c = d
m
srd
m
rdσ
2
d, a1 = η Psd
m
rd, b1 = η d
m
srPd,
c1 = η σ
2
r d
m
srd
m
rd, r1 = d
m
srd
m
rdd
m
reσ
2
e .
Theorem 3. The ergodic secrecy capacity for the IRR can be
given by
C¯ [IRR]s =
[
E
[
CIRRd
]− E [CIRRe ]]+ , (28)
where E
[
CIRRd
]
and E
[
CIRRe
]
are given in (29) and (31), re-
spectively, which can be approximated using Gaussian Quadra-
ture rule as in (30) and (32), respectively, [11].
Proof: To start with the SINR at the destination can
be written as γd =
X
b+Y , where X = a
|hrdhsr|2
‖hrd‖2 and
Y = c‖hrd‖2 . From (15), we can write, E
[
CIRRd
]
=
1
2 ln(2)
∞´
0
Mb+Y (z)
z (1−MX (z)) dz, where MX (z) = λxλx+a z
E
[
CASPSe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
e−zb3
z
(
1− λχ
λχ + b1z
)(
λy
λy + b2z
)
dz (24)
E
[
CASPSe
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λχb3
λχb3 + b1zi
)(
λyb3
λyb3 + b2zi
)
(25)
E
[
CIRRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λx
λx + a z
)
2e−zb (c z)Nr/2 KNr (2
√
c z)
Γ (Nr)
dz. (29)
E
[
CIRRd
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λxb
λxb+ a zi
)
2
(
c zi
b
)Nr/2
KNr
(
2
√
c zi
b
)
Γ (Nr)
. (30)
E
[
CIRRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
e−zc1
z
(
1− λΦ
λΦ + a1 z
)
λΥ
λΥ + b1z
2 (r1 z)
Nr/2 KNr
(
2
√
r1 z
)
Γ (Nr)
dz. (31)
E
[
CIRRe
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
zi
(
1− λΦc1
λΦc1 + a1 zi
)
λΥc1
λΥc1 + b1zi
2
(
r1 zi
c1
)Nr/2
KNr
(
2
√
r1 zi
c1
)
Γ (Nr)
dz. (32)
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Figure 3: The maximum achievable ergodic secrecy capacity versus Nr
for different values of η ( Int-Lim denotes interference limited system).
, and Mb+Y (z) = 2 e
−zb(c z)Nr/2KNr (2
√
c z)
Γ(Nr)
. Following simi-
lar steps, we can find the ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper
as in (31).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical results to eval-
uate the analytical expressions derived and to investigate the
effect of the main system parameters on the secrecy capacity.
Unless stated otherwise, the distances dsr, drd and dre are
normalized to unity, η = 1, Ps = 30 dBm, Pd = 30 dBm,
and m = 2.7. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
the noise variances at all the nodes are equal σr = σd = σe =
10 dBm and σa = σc = σr/2; also all the channel parameters
λx, λχ, λΦ, λy and λΥ are set to 1.
A. Effect of Relay Antennas and EH-Efficiency
In Fig. 3, the maximum achievable ergodic secrecy capacity
is plotted with respect to the number of relay antennas, Nr,
for various values of η. From these results, it is clearly visible
that the IRR outperforms the ASPS and PSR in terms of the
ergodic secrecy capacity for same system parameters values.
It can also be seen that, for all systems, Cs enhances when
either η or Nr increases and this is because increasing η and/or
Nr will always reduce the optimal values of ρ and λ, which
is expected since higher values of η or Nr means that more
amount of energy can be harvested with smaller power ratios
for PSR and ASPS. Therefore, smaller values of ρ and λ are
required to attain the optimal system performance.
B. Effect of Relay/Eavesdropper Locations and AN Power
In order to investigate the effect of the relay/eavesdropper
locations and the AN power, Pd, on the system secrecy, we
study a simple one-dimensional model. In this simple model,
the legitimate receiver is placed at (10, 0) meter away from
the source (0, 0) meter whilst the relay and the eavesdropper
positions are varied.
1) Effect of Relay Location and AN Power: Firstly, the
eavesdropper is located at (7.5,0) meter and the relay position
varies from (0, 0) meter to (7.5, 0) meter. Fig. 4 depicts a 3D
surface plot for the ergodic secrecy capacity versus dsr and
Pd for the three protocols when ρ and λ are optimized. In this
figure we adopt the following system parameters Nr = 8 and
Ps = 35 dBm. The common observation in the three schemes
is that, when the relay node is close to the source, the optimal
secrecy capacity is at its minimum and the optimal secrecy
capacity enhances as the relay node moves away toward the
legitimate receiver. This is because when the relay is far away
from the legitimate receiver, the received AN signal at the relay
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Figure 4: Optimal secrecy capacity versus dsr and Pd for the PSR, ASPS and IRR-based systems (markers represent numerical results).
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Figure 5: Optimal secrecy capacity versus dre and Pd for the PSR, ASPS and IRR-based systems (markers represent numerical results).
in the first phase will be weak. As a consequence of this, the
AN signal cannot provide high protection for the information
signal in the second phase.
2) Effect of Eavesdropper Location and AN Power: In the
second scenario, we fix the relay position at (5, 0) meter
and the eavesdropper position varies from (6,0) meter to
(13, 0) meter. Fig. 5 represents a 3D surface plot for the
ergodic secrecy capacity versus dre and Pd for the three
protocols when ρ and λ are optimized. To be able to explain
this impact more clearly, we reduce the noise variance to
σr = σd = σe = 0 dBm. As we can see from the figure now,
the secrecy capacity enhances slightly as the eavesdropper
moves away from the relay in all the EH schemes.
Finally, from the two scenarios it is clearly visible that
increasing the AN power will always improve the system
secrecy; Its benefit is more obvious in IRR scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated physical layer security
for EH-based AF relaying system. Three common EH proto-
cols, namely, PSR, ASPS and IRR have been studied. For each
EH-protocol, we derived explicit mathematical expressions for
the ergodic secrecy capacity. Results have shown that, the er-
godic secrecy capacity always improves as the relay antennas,
the distance from the relay-to-the source/eavesdropper, and/or
AN power increase.
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